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Chapter 8
Perspectives from the President’s
Commission on Social Security Reform
John F. Cogan and Olivia S. Mitchell
Social Security faces a severe financial problem. In about fifteen years, the
program will begin to experience permanent annual cash deficits, when
annual benefit payments will exceed the amount collected in payroll tax
revenues. By 2041, according to the Social Security Trustees 2002 Report,
the Social Security trust fund is projected to be insolvent, meaning that
the program will be legally unable to pay scheduled benefits. One way of
expressing the financial shortfall is to compute the present value of the
difference between system outlays and revenues over a 75-year horizon,
which is currently equal to a permanent and immediate tax rate increase of
1.86 percent of payroll, or equivalent to $3.2 trillion in present value. If the
policy of PAYGO financing is continued for the next 25 years, a 50 percent
payroll tax increase will be required at that time to pay scheduled benefits.
Social Security’s bleak financial outlook is not its only significant prob-
lem. For current workers, system benefits represent very low returns on pay-
roll tax contributions. The inflation-adjusted return is 1–2 percent for work-
ers earning an average wage, less than 3 percent for low-income retirees
and negative for some higher earners and dual-worker couples. Moreover,
Social Security fails to provide adequate protection against poverty. For
example, 1 in every 4 divorced, separated, or never-married women older
than 65 years lived in poverty in 1999. Those in the bottom half of the
American earnings distribution, including a larger segment of the African-
American and Hispanic population, lack a pool of private savings to support
them in old age, and Social Security has no minimum poverty line benefit.
Finally, there is ample evidence that the system induces workers to save
less and retire early, so that the program’s structure creates potentially
This chapter previously appeared in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(2) Spring 2003: 149–
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substantial capital and labor market inefficiencies (Congressional Budget
Office 1998; Gruber and Wise 2002).
In 2001 President George W. Bush appointed the President’s Commis-
sion to Strengthen Social Security, with sixteen members drawn equally
from both major political parties. As members, we were charged to provide
the president with recommendations to modernize the Social Security sys-
tem, restore its fiscal soundness, and develop a workable system of personal
retirement accounts as part of a newly structured program.1 In this chap-
ter, we offer our own perspectives on Social Security reform, drawn from
service on the President’s Commission. We begin with a discussion of the
use of personal retirement accounts as a method of prefunding the Social
Security system. The Commission to Strengthen Social Security developed
three reform scenarios that incorporate personal retirement accounts as a
central element in a modernized system of old-age security. Here, we focus
on one reform plan in particular, one that promises an enhanced and more
reliable safety net while also providing workers the opportunity to invest in
personal accounts with diversified investment choice and potentially lower
risk. Reforms of this sort can, we believe, help put Social Security on a self-
financing basis for the first time in over a quarter of a century.
Perspectives on Funding and Personal Accounts
If Social Security reform is to reduce the tax burden imposed on future
generations while maintaining adequate benefit levels, the system must
move toward a prefunded program (Feldstein 1996). Moving from what
is mainly a PAYGO unfunded transfer program to a funded Social Security
program might be accomplished in several ways. The federal government
might invest surplus Social Security funds directly in capital markets. The
federal government could use surplus funds to pay down the publicly
held debt. Or the government must permit individuals to carry out the
prefunding in the form of personal investment accounts.
Centralized Government Investment of Social Security Surpluses
In 1998, Alan Greenspan testified before Congress that government invest-
ment of Social Security surpluses in stocks and bonds would have ‘very far-
reaching potential dangers for a free American economy and a free Amer-
ican society’. Similar concerns were held by the Senate and the president.
In 1999 the Senate rejected—with a 99–0 vote—a proposal to allow the
government to invest the Social Security surpluses in the capital market. In
his 2001 charge to the Commission, President Bush ruled out allowing the
federal government to invest Social Security in corporate assets.
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Commissioners’ views were no different. Members worried that surpluses
would be used for ‘socially targeted’ investments, rather than for diver-
sified capital market holdings. Moreover, if the federal government were
to become a major corporate shareholder, commissioners worried that it
would vote its shares in ways that would serve political or social objectives
at the expense of Social Security returns and the economy’s overall per-
formance. Shoven (2001) offered testimony about the costly impact of the
California State employee pension fund trustees’ decision to divest the fund
of tobacco stocks. Schwarz (2001) testified about her analysis of govern-
ment investment in other countries, where she found that most countries in
which the government invested pension funds had very poor experiences.
At worst, government-invested pension funds lost money during the 1990s;
at best, they earned bank-level rates of return. Her pessimistic conclusion
was that ‘experience with publicly managed funds has been disastrous’.
Financial considerations aside, a program of government investment
would also mean that the government, rather than workers and retirees,
would own and dispose of the accumulated retirement assets. Commis-
sioners felt that personal ownership of retirement assets would give some
workers an incentive to save more, while adoption of a DC structure would
mitigate the program’s adverse incentives to retire earlier.
Using Surpluses to Pay Down the Publicly Held Debt
To avoid the perils of government investment in private firms, the govern-
ment might alternatively use Social Security trust fund revenues to pay
down the publicly held debt. In contrast, adopting a personal account
system financed by payroll taxes would mean that future annual Social
Security surpluses would not be available for reducing the federal debt held
by the public. The latter issue did not overly worry commissioners, as most
were skeptical of the federal government’s ability to sustain a policy of using
Social Security surpluses to pay down the federal debt. This skepticism
stemmed from our reading of Social Security’s extensive legislative history
(for historical background, see Weaver 1982; Cogan 1998; Schieber and
Shoven 1999). From Social Security’s founding in the mid-1930s through
the mid-1990s, each time surpluses occurred—as a result of policy design,
a wartime economy, or a peacetime period of noninflationary economic
growth—the congressional response was to raise benefits or liberalize
eligibility.
The process began with the original Social Security Act 1935 under the
auspices of President Franklin Roosevelt. His initial plan was to amass
substantial surpluses during the program’s early years, which were to be
used to reduce federal debt held by the public. The reduction in other
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federal debt and the interest savings were to be credited to the Social
Security program through a reserve account. Later, when Social Security
was forecasted to incur deficits, the reserve account would be drawn down
to finance benefit payments. The plan hit difficulties almost immediately.
By the end of the 1930s, the Social Security system’s reserve policy collapsed
under dual pressure from those who sought to liberalize benefits and from
those who feared that surpluses might lead to higher federal spending
on programs other than Social Security. In 1939, Congress dissipated the
surplus by raising benefits, issuing the first benefit checks a year earlier
than originally planned and granting eligibility to survivors and spouses.
During the 1940s, the wartime economy again produced large Social
Security surpluses. By 1950, the accumulated surpluses were sufficient to
finance the next ten years of benefit payments. Again, pressure mounted to
spend the surplus, and Congress responded. In each election year during
the 1950s, Congress raised benefits or expanded eligibility. By the end of
the decade, the surplus had been spent. By the 1960s, strong economic
growth had produced Social Security surpluses. For a third time, federal
government’s response was the same. Congress boosted benefits a total of
seven times over the nine-year period from 1965 to 1973. These benefit
increases totaled 83 percent, and along with a poorly performing economy,
they brought Social Security to the brink of insolvency by the mid-1970s.
Since then, Congress has not significantly raised Social Security benefits
in real terms. However, deficits plagued the program until the mid-1980s,
and system’s surpluses over the next decade were modest in size. Not until
1992 did the surpluses accumulate to one year’s worth of benefit payouts.
Then in 1994, facing deficits in the disability program that threatened pay-
ments to currently disabled workers, Congress enacted legislation to divert
funds from the Social Security old-age program to pay for the Disability
Insurance program. Formally, this was accomplished by reducing the Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance tax rate and boosting the Disability Insurance
tax rate by equal amounts. This tax diversion, which continues today at a
rate of $25 billion per year, will total about $160 billion by the end of this
fiscal year.
Commissioners also found little reason to believe that Social Security
surpluses remaining after the legislative actions just described were used
to reduce the debt substantially. In our view, it was more credible that
Social Security surpluses produced an increase in federal spending on non-
Social Security programs and tax reductions, a viewpoint that is widespread
among economists. For instance, at a 1989 American Enterprise Insti-
tute conference on Social Security, conference participants Alan Blinder,
Barry Bosworth, James Buchanan, William Nordhaus, James Poterba,
John Shoven, and Carolyn Weaver all expressed the view that previous
Congresses had spent Social Security surpluses (Weaver 1990). Similar
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conclusions were reached by Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (1989) and
earlier by Munnell and Blais (1984). There is little hard research evidence
on this point, though the only systematic economic analysis of the issue,
by Crain and Marlow (1990), found statistical support for the conclusion
that Social Security surpluses led to more non-Social Security spending. In
view of the persistent tendency of past Congresses to spend Social Security
surpluses, the Commission concluded that it seemed imprudent to assume
that future Congresses would behave differently.
This conclusion was reinforced by budgetary actions that occurred dur-
ing the Commission’s deliberations in 2001. A combination of recession,
appropriations increases, and a tax cut transformed anticipated federal
budget surpluses into deficits. Surplus Social Security revenues were once
again being used to finance federal spending other than on the retirement
system. Many commissioners felt that individually owned personal accounts
would more strongly insulate workers’ Social Security taxes from political
pressures and thereby improve the chances of prefunding. Though future
Congresses may never be completely precluded from using a share of work-
ers’ accounts for purposes other than retirement, individual ownership, in
our view, would make it more difficult.
The Meaning of the Trust Fund
When describing Social Security’s financial problems, the Commission
focused on the program’s future cash flow shortfalls, rather than on trust
fund accounting. An examination of Social Security cash flows recognizes
that, as a practical matter of government finance, Congress will be required
to take some budgetary action when the Social Security system begins to
incur annual cash flow deficits and when the general fund will need to
repay what it has borrowed from the Social Security trust fund. At that
point, the federal government will have to raise additional revenues by
taxing or borrowing, cutting Social Security benefits, or freeing up revenue
by cutting other government programs.
The practical meaning of the trust fund, as opposed to cash flow short-
falls, depends on how Social Security affects the rest of the federal budget.
If Social Security surpluses are used to reduce other federal debt, the trust
fund balance represents a governmental asset, the value of which equals
the amount of debt reduction and associated interest savings. However,
if Social Security surpluses are used to finance more non-Social Security
spending or tax reductions, then the trust fund balance does not represent
a governmental asset. Instead, it is more accurately viewed as a political
claim on future general fund revenues that will have to compete with other
budgetary claims.
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This distinction also means that focusing on the trust fund can give a
misleading assessment of how personal accounts affect federal finances.
Under standard budgeting practice, the trust fund balance is treated as
a governmental asset regardless of whether the surplus revenues are used
to reduce the publicly held debt. Hence, diverting a share of Social Secu-
rity payroll taxes into personal accounts appears to drain the trust fund’s
assets and to reduce investment returns credited to these trust fund assets.
However, if Social Security surpluses are not used to reduce the federal
debt but instead are spent on current consumption, then they are not a
governmental asset to be drained, and there are no investment returns to
be reduced by personal accounts.
The trust fund’s use of a 75-year time horizon also produces a mislead-
ing assessment of the impact of personal accounts, even if future trust
fund surpluses were used for debt reduction. Payroll-tax-financed personal
accounts reduce the trust fund’s net income during the early years of the
policy, but in later years, the trust fund’s net income rises as personal
account annuities offset Social Security liabilities. Using a fixed time hori-
zon truncates the years of net income gain and thereby produces a down-
wardly biased estimate of how personal accounts enhance Social Security
solvency.
To see this, consider a plan under which workers could divert 2 percent-
age points of their payroll tax rate into personal accounts. Assume that
those who opt for personal accounts are required to forgo in traditional
Social Security benefits the diverted contributions plus a 3 percent real rate
of return on these contributions. Under the assumptions used by the Social
Security Trustees, the 3 percent real return is precisely what the trust fund
would have earned on these funds, so the policy would seem financially
neutral for the trust fund in perpetuity. Yet, if a 75-year horizon were used
to assess the policy, the long-run actuarial imbalance would rise from its
current level of −1.86 percent of payroll to −2.46 percent, a 32-percent
increase. Clearly, the bias created by using a fixed 75-year time horizon is
not trivial.
This problem can be easily avoided by extending the accounting time
horizon to perpetuity. Alternatively, many economists have proposed to
use ‘generational accounting’ to track Social Security and other long-term
fiscal liabilities not currently tracked on budget.2 Adopting a longer-term
perspective would remove the budget’s current bias against prefunding
implicit long-term liabilities and give policymakers an essential tool for
making and justifying more informed long-term decisions.
Prefunding necessarily implies increasing current saving, which we have
argued is not readily accomplished via a governmental trust fund. Indeed,
we believe that focusing on trust fund accounting can itself be mislead-
ing and certainly does not enhance the prospects for maintaining fiscal
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solvency in the long run. For this reason, and in keeping with the presi-
dent’s charge, the Commission proposed several alternative structures for
funded personal retirement accounts.
A Two-Tiered System
Most commissioners did not contemplate permitting workers to invest their
entire payroll taxes in private securities, believing that this idea would be
too radical a departure from the current program. Furthermore, President
Bush’s charge to the Commission proposed that personal accounts should
augment Social Security, rather than replace it. Consequently, commis-
sioners concurred that a reformed Social Security system should have two
interrelated tiers.
An advantage of such an approach is that it allows building on the
existing retirement system. A modified traditional Social Security program
serves as Tier I and would provide an enhanced safety net. Its benefit struc-
ture would be altered in several ways, discussed below, to improve its role
as a backstop against old-age poverty. Personal retirement accounts in Tier
II would offer an investment-based component, enhancing individuals’
opportunity to build financial wealth as a source of retirement income.
The concept of a two-tiered program has been the subject of
considerable prior academic research, and it is regarded as a mainstream
idea today in policy circles. The essential elements of a two-tiered US
program were presented to the Greenspan Commission two decades ago
(Boskin 1982). Since then, numerous proposals embodying a two-tier
structure have been developed by economists and policymakers (e.g. see
Weaver 1990; Gramlich 1996; Feldstein and Samwick 1998; Moynihan
1998; Schieber and Shoven 1999; Koitz 2001). Elected officials are also
familiar with the real-world example of the Thrift Saving Plan, which is a
retirement program adopted fifteen years ago for federal civilian (and later
military) personnel. A wide range of two-tiered plans has been discussed
in Congress. Additionally, a two-tiered approach has been successfully
implemented in a number of countries, including England, Australia,
and, most recently, Sweden. A two-tiered approach not only serves as
a mechanism for prefunding through private accounts, but it also has
other advantages. For instance, a two-tiered approach gives the Social
Security program a greater degree of transparency. Since its inception,
Social Security has balanced the tension between social adequacy and
individual equity. Social adequacy seeks to ensure that retirees attain a
certain standard of living in old age, which requires income transfers from
high-earner to low-earner workers over their lifetimes. Individual equity,
on the other hand, seeks to ensure that each worker’s contributions are
closely linked to his or her retirement benefits.
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The current program’s complexity is the result of years of legislative
efforts to meet these competing goals with a single benefit formula. This
complexity has produced many inequities and anomalous redistribution
patterns, and it yields a surprisingly low level of lifetime income redistribu-
tion (Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass 2000; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000;
Liebman 2001). Creating two separate tiers under Social Security, each
with its own goal, would improve the overall program’s transparency and
equity. Thus, in each of the Commission’s plans, social adequacy became
the principal objective of Tier I, while individual equity became the main
objective of Tier II. This greater transparency would enable policymakers
to make more informed choices about appropriate benefit and tax levels,
and it should also enable plan participants to make better savings and
retirement decisions.
An additional policy rationale for a two-tiered system is that it may entail
less political and economic risk than a single-tiered program (Shoven
2001). Despite considerable confusion on this point among public policy
officials, the news media, and the public at large, traditional Social Security
benefits are not ‘guaranteed’. As the Social Security Administration indi-
cates (http://www.ssa.gov/history/nestor.html):
There has been a temptation throughout the program’s history for some people to
suppose that their FICA [Federal Insurance Contributions Act] payroll taxes entitle
them to a benefit in a legal, contractual sense. That is to say, if a person makes
FICA contributions over a number of years, Congress cannot, according to this
reasoning, change the rules in such a way that deprives a contributor of a promised
future benefit. . . . Congress clearly had no such limitation in mind when crafting
the law. . . . Like all federal entitlement programs, Congress can change the rules
regarding eligibility—and it has done so many times over the years. The rules can
be made more generous, or they can be made more restrictive. Benefits which are
granted at one time can be withdrawn. . . .
Furthermore, the US Supreme Court ruled in Flemming v. Nestor (63 US 603
[1960]) that workers and beneficiaries have no legal ownership over their
benefits, even after a lifetime of paying taxes into the system. The payment
of scheduled benefits under the Social Security system remains contingent
on the hope that politicians elected 20–30 years from now will decide to
generate the revenue needed to pay benefits scheduled under present law,
given the constraints and choices they face at that future date.
History shows that Congress has previously altered scheduled Social
Security benefits a number of times, and in some instances, the benefit
changes have been quite substantial. For instance, Congress passed legisla-
tion that reduced the growth of scheduled benefits in 1977, 1983, and 1993.
The 1977 amendments reduced benefits by 19 percent from their promised
levels for workers who were aged 62 years in 1980 and by 30 percent for
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workers aged 54 years in 1980 (Commission on the Social Security ‘Notch’
Issue 1994: 78). Looking ahead, commissioners felt that the political risk of
achieving a given level of retirement income is substantial, since the system
faces even larger shortfalls as a result of the program’s worsening financing
problems.
There is also economic risk stemming from the linkage between benefit
promises and national average earnings. Given an individual worker’s life-
time wage profile, variations in national average earnings due to changes
in productivity produce variations in individuals’ Social Security benefits.3
Social Security’s benefit formula, in effect, spreads ‘productivity’ risk across
cohorts, imparting additional uncertainty regarding eventual benefits paid
under the current system.
Achieving a given level of retirement income through investment-based
individual accounts is, of course, also subject to uncertainty due to capital
market volatility. But commissioners believed that this risk would be better
managed with a Tier I level of benefits in place, paired with the opportunity
to diversify investments via a personal account in Tier II.
Changes in First-Tier Benefits: From Wage Indexing to
Price Indexing
Personal accounts alone will not put the Social Security program on a
sound financial basis. Meeting President Bush’s charge to restore the pro-
gram’s fiscal soundness required additional steps to reduce the growth
of future liabilities. In assessing its options, the Commission undertook a
review of current and past policy for determining Social Security benefits
and its implications for future costs.4 In particular, this research investi-
gated current benefit promises and the role of wage versus price indexing
in the benefit formula.
Under current law, initial retirement benefits are indexed to wages, and
after retirement, they are price indexed. When calculating initial Social
Security benefits, a worker’s average indexed monthly earnings are com-
puted by indexing that worker’s highest thirty-five years of earnings to
the average growth in national earnings. Next, initial monthly benefits
are derived from the worker’s average monthly earnings, a formula also
indexed to average earnings.5 The main rationale for wage indexing is to
ensure that initial benefits for each cohort of retirees replace a specified
portion (the ‘replacement rate’) of that cohort’s pre-retirement pay. Under
current rules, a worker who earns median wages over an entire career
receives an expected initial benefit worth roughly 40 percent of the median
wage at retirement. After the initial level of benefits is in place, subsequent
benefit payments are linked to the Consumer Price Index, not the rate of
08-Kay-and-Sinha-c08 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 224 of 241 August 20, 2007 17:39
224 John F. Cogan and Olivia S. Mitchell
wage increase. Wage indexing has been part of the Social Security program
for less than half of its history. From the program’s inception in 1935 until
1975, neither workers’ wage histories nor benefits for currently retired
workers were indexed to wage growth or inflation rates. Rather, when
deciding to grant a benefit increase, Congress balanced the social adequacy
of benefit levels against the resources available to finance an increase. In
doing so, Congress focused mainly on preserving the purchasing power
of benefits, while paying little attention to wage replacement rates (Hsiao
1979). For example, the current 40 percent replacement rate policy was
established in a 1977 law, but as late as 1970, the replacement rate for a
worker with median wages was only 34 percent (Committee on Ways and
Means 2000).
Wage indexing means that the purchasing power of Social Security ben-
efits will likely rise from one retirement cohort to the next, as increases in
worker productivity cause wages to grow faster than prices. The intermedi-
ate assumptions of the Social Security Trustees project that real wages will
grow at a 1.3 percent average annual rate during the next decade and at
a 1 percent annual rate thereafter (Social Security Board of Trustees 2001:
84). Under this assumption, a ‘typical’ worker aged 45 years in 2001 who
earns the average Social Security taxable wage every year and retires at age
65 years is slated to receive a monthly payment 20 percent higher in real
terms than the benefit paid to an average worker retiring in 2001. Similarly,
scheduled benefits for today’s teenagers are scheduled to be 60 percent
higher than benefits paid to a typical worker retiring in 2001.6
Wage indexing has been controversial from the time it was first proposed.
Both the report of the 1975 Consultant Panel on Social Security and the
minority report of the Advisory Council on Social Security (1979: 233–4)
issued strong objections to the policy on equity and cost grounds.7 Their
equity concerns can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider two
workers whose retirement ages are five years apart and who have identi-
cal earnings at each point in their life cycles. These workers will receive
different inflation-adjusted Social Security benefits even though they have
contributed identical amounts to Social Security, solely because the general
level of real wages rises over time. Similarly, both the Consultant Panel and
the Advisory Panel expressed concerns that wage indexing would threaten
Social Security’s financial solvency. The Consultant Panel on Social Security
(1976: 6) warned that financing a wage-indexed system would ultimately
require an eventual 50–80 percent increase in the payroll tax rate. History
has justified their concerns: since wage indexing was adopted, the Social
Security Trustees have reported that the program has been financially
insolvent in twenty-three of their last twenty-five annual reports. By con-
trast, actuarial calculations performed for our Commission showed that if
the real purchasing power of initial benefits paid to future retirees were
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maintained at the level provided to today’s retirees—that is, adjusted for
prices rather than for wages—future benefits could be paid without any
increase in the payroll tax rate. While a wage replacement policy might
have been a worthy Social Security program goal at an earlier historical
period, our view is that this goal’s importance has diminished as per capita
incomes have risen and other retirement savings vehicles, such as IRAs and
401(k) plans, have become more widely available. Wage replacement may
be viewed as a desirable goal of a comprehensive pension policy, without
needing to be the principal and overriding objective of Tier I of a revamped
Social Security program. Our reforms would allow future Congresses to
increase the real initial level of Social Security benefits, if it were feasible to
do so, after considering and balancing the competing needs of programs
to enhance security, health care, and retirement well-being.
An Illustrative Reform Plan
The Commission sketched three reform plans in its final report. Here we
focus on one of them, known as Model 2, to illustrate key points. That
approach would replace wage indexing with a policy under which initial
benefits would grow from one retirement cohort to the next at the rate
of growth of prices. Therefore, workers in successive retirement cohorts
with identical real wages would automatically receive the same real monthly
benefits. This policy would be implemented in 2009, so that no beneficiary
currently older than 55 years would see any change in benefits. As a result,
inflation-adjusted benefits received by future retirees would be slightly
higher than those received by workers who retired in 2001. For workers
currently younger than 55 years, initial benefits would grow 1 percent per
year more slowly than under current law.
Price indexing initial benefits is a very powerful reform: our calculations
indicate that it would produce long-term savings sufficient to put Social
Security back on a sound actuarial footing. As noted earlier, the Social
Security system now confronts a long-run actuarial deficit of 1.86 percent
of payroll (if the shortfall were smoothly assessed over a 75-year calculation
window). In other words, an immediate and permanent tax increase of 1.86
percent of payroll would close the actuarial gap, assuming the surpluses
would be saved and not spent. Moving to price indexing would reduce
Social Security’s long-term liabilities by 2.07 percent of payroll over the
same period, thereby creating an actuarial surplus of 0.2 percent of pay-
roll over the 75-year horizon. Commissioners proposed that the resulting
surplus, the present value of which amounts to about $300 billion, could
be allocated to raising inflation-adjusted benefits to low-wage workers and
widows of deceased low-wage workers.
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Some might think that price indexing would be difficult to implement,
since politicians might be unwilling to reduce the replacement rate. We
disagree, on the grounds that Congress has, in the past, reduced replace-
ment rates on several occasions. For instance, the 1977 Social Security
amendments reduced replacement rates by 30 percent for workers aged 54
years and younger in 1980. The 1983 amendments, by raising the ‘normal’
retirement age, will cut replacement rates by 14 percent when they are
fully phased in. The 1993 amendments, by taxing Social Security benefits,
reduced replacement rates by 7 percent for some middle-income retirees
and by as much as 20 percent for high-income retirees. We also emphasize
that, under Commission plans, retirement income from both tiers of the
new Social Security program would provide benefits for low- and middle-
income workers that are at least as high as they are at present, and for
many, benefits would be much higher.
Tier II: Personal Retirement Accounts
President Bush’s charge to the Commission called for plans that would
allow workers a choice to invest part of their payroll taxes in a voluntary
personal retirement account, as part of a reform that improved the Social
Security system’s long-term fiscal status and in a way that did not increase
payroll taxes nor permanently divert general revenues. This charge had
several policy implications for the structure of Tier II accounts.
First, these voluntary accounts would need to be structured, so par-
ticipants would find them potentially attractive. The plans should offer
participants some investment choice while they would still be relatively
inexpensive to operate. Keeping fees low implied that the accounts should
be made as large as possible quickly, competition among fund managers
should be encouraged, and investment choices should be limited to hold
down management fees. Second, these accounts would have to be at least
partially financed by permitting workers to redirect a portion of their pay-
roll taxes into these accounts. Third, participants who elected to contribute
less payroll tax to the traditional system should receive lower Tier I Social
Security benefits, though, of course, they would receive their Tier II per-
sonal account benefits, as well. Fourth, the personal retirement accounts
should be targeted at lower-paid workers, both to maintain system progres-
sivity and because this segment of the labor force is least well served by
corporate pensions and tends to have the lowest saving rates.
Designing Personal Accounts
To illustrate how the policy objectives were weighed in practice, it is useful
to focus again on the Commission’s Model 2. Under this plan, all workers
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younger than 55 years would be permitted to redirect 4 percentage points
of their payroll taxes voluntarily into their personal accounts, up to a $1,000
cap. This cap would be indexed to wage growth. The personal account
would enable a young worker earning $25,000 annually to anticipate build-
ing a retirement account worth over $150,000 in retirement wealth (in
2001 dollars). While all persons currently younger than 55 years could
participate in and benefit from personal accounts, we anticipated that
lower-wage workers would benefit the most, since they are least likely to
have company-sponsored pensions at present.
Under this plan, workers who opt for a personal account would be
required to forgo a portion of their traditional Social Security benefit.
The Commission recommended that the amount foregone depend on the
amount of payroll taxes the worker elected to divert to personal accounts
instead of basing the amount on the size of the personal account annuity at
retirement. Under Model 2, for instance, the amount foregone equals the
worker’s contributions plus a 2 percent real rate of return. Consequently,
a worker who expected personal account investments to yield a real return
higher than 2 percent would anticipate being better off opting for the
personal account. Because workers who opt for personal accounts expect
to receive the full amount of each dollar of investment returns above the
2 percent threshold, the policy does not distort incentives for saving. The
Commission considered, but did not adopt, an alternative that would con-
dition first-tier benefits on the actual amount that workers had accumulated
in their personal accounts at retirement. This approach, called a ‘clawback’,
suffers from the drawback that it reduces the marginal return on savings
and, therefore, distorts savings decisions. The Commission’s offset policy
also has the desirable feature that it minimizes possible adverse impacts of
personal accounts on Social Security’s progressivity. High-wage workers will
forgo a larger share of their traditional benefits than will low-wage workers
for each dollar of personal account contributions.8
Administrative Considerations
Substantial discussion focused on the design of an administrative plan
for personal retirement accounts (for discussion of administrative design
issues, see Mitchell 1998; Shipman 1999; Shoven 2000; Feldstein and
Liebman 2002). Ultimately, the Commission proposed starting with a cen-
tralized approach, similar to the federal Thrift Saving Plan that today
covers civil servants and military employees. Under this format, a single
central governing board would collect contributions, manage records and,
via a competitive process, select private-sector managers who would invest
participant assets. In addition, recordkeeping and benefit payments would
be handled by the governing board or would be outsourced. This proposal
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strikes a balance between the scale economy benefits from centralization
of recordkeeping versus the attractiveness of enhanced competition. The
Commission proposed that after a few years, plan participants would be per-
mitted to move their investments from the centralized system into a more
decentralized one with licensed, private money managers. This two-phased
approach should avoid the need to regulate fund loads or charges, since a
combination of competition and information provided by the central fund
administrator was anticipated to drive down fees and charges.
Investment Options in the Personal Accounts
When analyzing the investment options offered under a system of per-
sonal retirement accounts, the Commission proposed to offer investors
a limited choice of indexed portfolios, including a Government Securi-
ties Investment fund that held mainly short-term US Treasury securities;
a Fixed Income Index Investment fund that tracks a US bond market
index; a Common Stock Index Investment fund tracking the Standard
& Poor’s 500 Index of large-company stock; a Small Capitalization Stock
Index Investment fund that tracks the Wilshire 4500 stock index; and
an International Stock Index Investment fund that holds corporate assets
located in Australia, Europe, and the Far East. In addition, the Commission
recommended that one investment option include Government Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities. Those who later elect to move their accounts
to private management would gain some additional choices, but they would
still have to invest in low-cost diversified accounts. In all cases, the accounts
would be required to invest in a broad range of corporations across all
major commercial sectors. Further, the amount of the fund invested in any
particular corporation could not significantly exceed the market value of
that corporation, relative to other firms in the fund.
Recent economic research also suggests the high value of offering
participants a portfolio balanced between stocks and bonds, should work-
ers and retirees fail to indicate how to allocate their personal retirement
accounts (Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Choi et al. 2002; Mitchell and Utkus
2002). We therefore proposed that investors should be permitted to change
the investment allocations in their personal retirement accounts annually.
This provision would offer some flexibility, yet it would also encourage
participants to think of their investments as ‘long-term savings’ rather than
short-term funds.
The Key Role of Actuarial Assumptions
In keeping with past practice of having serious proposals thoroughly vetted,
the financial impact of all the Commission’s reform plans was scored by
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the Office of the Chief Actuary at the Social Security Administration. This
office provided the actuarial assumptions used in cost and benefit projec-
tions developed under advice from the Social Security Board of Trustees.
Since the actuarial assumptions used by Social Security are well known and
easily available at http://www.ssa.gov, we offer a sense of some key magni-
tudes rather than providing detail. In all cases, the projections assume a
real expected future return on stocks of 6.5 percent per year. Corporate
and Treasury bonds are assumed to deliver a real rate of return of 3.5 and
3.0 percent, respectively. The actuary’s projections further assume that a
typical participant holds a balanced fund, with half of the assets in a broadly
diversified equity portfolio and half in a similarly diversified bond portfolio.
The administrative costs of private retirement accounts are assumed to total
30 basis points (0.3% of the account balance).
Commissioners regarded these assumptions as conservative. The US gov-
ernment’s Thrift Saving Plan, for example, operates with administrative
costs of only 8 basis points. Also, under the assumed rates of return and
portfolio composition, the expected real return net of expenses for a 50/50
stock/bond portfolio is 4.6 percent, a return lower than that used in many
academic and policy studies.
Access to Funds
Commissioners thought hard about whether to permit pre-retirement
access to the funds in personal retirement accounts. On the one hand, all
agreed that retirement funds should be earmarked for old age, implying
that workers should not be permitted to consume the assets if it would leave
them dependent on government’s antipoverty programs during retire-
ment. On the other hand, a clear appeal of personal retirement accounts is
that they grant workers ownership over their own assets. This latter view was
of particular concern for groups anticipating below-average life expectan-
cies, such as African-Americans, the ill, and the lifetime poor. Ultimately,
the Commission concurred that personal account funds would have to be
preserved until retirement. Pre-retirement stringencies should not be the
cause of individuals facing even greater stringencies during retirement.
This philosophy is in keeping with current Social Security policy, since
benefits now cannot be accessed prior to retirement nor used as collateral
for a loan.
Commission members also felt strongly that retirees should have a range
of possibilities for making withdrawals from their personal accounts. Draw-
ing on economic studies of annuity markets (Brown et al. 2001), our
models proposed that account distributions could take the form of an
annuity or periodic withdrawals, similar to the current 401(k) system. The
Commission recommended that a portion of funds above a minimum
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threshold would be accessible as a lump-sum distribution. The threshold
amount would be designed so that the yearly income received from an
individual’s Social Security benefit plus the joint annuity (if married) would
protect either spouse from falling below the poverty line during retirement.
Remaining assets could be bequeathed at death. Because lower-income
households have shorter life expectancies, the bequest option adds to the
Social Security system’s progressivity and would offer better protection to
widows than would today’s Social Security rules. In the case of divorce,
personal retirement account assets accumulated during marriage would
be divided between divorcing partners. This step would enhance protec-
tion of former spouses as compared to today’s Social Security rules that
do not provide benefits to former spouses from marriages lasting under
ten years.9
Another topic of debate pertained to how participants might invest their
personal retirement account assets after retirement and whether they might
be encouraged to switch to more conservative investments at some given
age. The main results assumed that a typical individual would hold personal
retirement funds in a 50/50 balanced stock and bond fund during both
the accumulation and decumulation periods (with the assumed return
mentioned above of 4.6% after inflation). After any lump-sum distribu-
tions, Tier II benefits would be received in the form of a variable annuity,
depending on the returns received in the underlying investment portfo-
lio. For those preferring greater certainty, and because the current Social
Security system pays benefits entirely as an inflation-indexed annuity, com-
missioners also proposed permitting inflation-indexed annuities during the
retirement phase.10 Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (2000) show that under
plausible assumptions about risk-aversion, retirees already receiving a real
annuity under the traditional Social Security system would prefer a Tier II
of variable annuities with a higher return rather than more real annuities.
In this context, it is worth noting that only about one-quarter of total
Social Security assets would be held in stocks by those opting for personal
accounts, including both Tier I traditional system and Tier II personal
retirement accounts.
Benefits under the Reformed System
When comparing benefits under the current system and the several alter-
natives proposed, the issue arose as to whether one should adjust personal
account annuities for financial risk. After discussion, commissioners con-
cluded that the best approach was to present all annuities in terms of their
expected values and to also discuss the risks of each annuity in a qualita-
tive manner. With this thought in mind, we summarize the reform plans
08-Kay-and-Sinha-c08 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 231 of 241 August 20, 2007 17:39
8 / Perspectives from the President’s Commission 231
Table 8-1 Projected Monthly Social Security
Benefits under Alternative Scenarios;
Projected to 2052, under Model 2
Structure (in Constant 2001 dollars)
I. Lifetime Low-Wage Earner
Today’s benefit 637
Projected Benefit with Personal Account
Low yield 867
Medium yield 1,050
High yield 1,090
Current program payable 713
Scheduled benefit —
II. Lifetime Medium-Wage Earner
Today’s benefit 1,052
Projected Benefit with Personal Account
Low yield 1,204
Medium yield 1,525
High yield 1,595
Current program payable 1,179
Schedule benefit —
III. Lifetime Maximum-Wage Earner
Today’s benefit 1,366
Projected benefit with personal account
Low yield 1,565
Medium yield 1,907
High yield 1,983
Current program payable 1,557
Scheduled benefit 2,151
Source: CSSS Final Report (2001).
Note: These categories, developed by the Social Security
actuaries, are specified (in 2001 dollars) such that a life-
time ‘low’ earner would have averaged approximately
$15,900 per year, whereas the medium earner averaged
$35,300 per annum, and the high earner $56,400.
by referring to expected projected retiree benefits under the alternative
reform proposals.
Results are summarized in Table 8-1, where anticipated outcomes are
illustrated for ‘low’, ‘average’, and ‘high’ earners under different policy
scenarios (in 2001 dollars). These categories, developed by the Social
Security actuaries, were specified such that a low earner in 2001 received
a lifetime average of approximately $16,000, whereas a medium earner
averaged about $35,300 per year and a high earner $56,400 per year. Results
in Table 8-1 depict benefits received at Social Security’s normal retirement
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age currently and in 2052, since the latter represents benefits anticipated
by a worker covered by the new system over an entire work life.
In Table 8-1, the first row of each panel labeled ‘Today’s benefit’ indicates
today’s benefit payments delivered to a worker at each lifetime earnings
level. The next 3 rows depict benefits anticipated under a Model 2 reform
for workers who elected personal accounts, allowing for alternative invest-
ment portfolios. The inflation-adjusted medium return is 4.6 percent, while
the lower yield is based on an assumed real return of 2.7 percent, and
the high yield plan assumes a real return of 4.92 percent (Commission to
Strengthen Social Security 2001b : 18–19). To illustrate the comparisons,
a lifetime low-wage worker retiring today receives benefits worth $637
per month. This is well below benefit payouts projected for a low-wage
employee opting for personal accounts, which would amount to $870–
$1,100 per month. The row labeled ‘Current Program Payable’ illustrates
that benefits of only $713 could be financed with currently legislated tax
rates. We note that reformed system benefits for low and medium earners
exceed current and payable future benefits. The final row, titled ‘Sched-
uled Benefits’, refers to the benefits payable if taxes were raised to cover
projected shortfalls. For the low earner, a scheduled (but not currently
affordable) benefit of $986 is below the Commission’s Model 2 payout,
assuming a medium portfolio yield.
A key lesson from Table 8-1 is that all workers who opt for personal
accounts under Model 2 can expect retirement benefits at least as high as,
and in some cases much larger than, today’s benefits adjusted for inflation.
Most would also anticipate payments higher than those the system can
afford to pay in the future under current law, and even conservative low
earners would receive higher benefits than the current program promises.
The gains relative to benefits the current system can afford to pay are more
modest, however. This illustrates the point that while Model 2’s personal
accounts can be expected to raise retirement income received from the
Social Security system (combining Tier I and Tier II), rates of return would
not be anticipated to be substantially higher.
Inasmuch as the system is progressive, the pattern of benefits paid will
vary by earnings levels, as we have shown. Under Model 2, today’s teenager
planning to retire in 2052 with a lifetime of medium earnings could expect
Social Security payments 42 percent larger than today’s benefits. Results
are even better for low earners, since the increment would be even larger
than 65 percent in real terms, compared to today’s retiree. High-wage
workers would also anticipate a benefit increase, but the percentage
increment is lower, at 40 percent, in keeping with the progressive intent
of the reform. The greater progressivity results from the fact that personal
retirement accounts are initially capped at $1,000, so low-wage workers
earning $25,000 or less can redirect 4 percentage points of their payroll
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taxes, but workers earning above $25,000 could redirect only a smaller
percentage. Additionally, as was noted above, improved protections are
provided against poverty, so benefit levels paid to all low-wage workers
would be raised the most.
In summary, under Model 2, Tier I benefits would deliver higher replace-
ment rates to low earners than can be financed under current law, and
absolute benefits would increase for all under the first pillar. Tier II offers
investors the option of doing better on the whole, as compared to the
current system, and even conservative low- and medium-earning workers
would expect to do better than what can be afforded with current tax
financing.
Impact on Federal Government Finances
Measuring the impact of proposed Social Security reforms on the federal
government’s finances is not straightforward when moving to a funded
system. One reason is that neither the annual federal budget nor the
ten-year projections currently recognize the existence of long-term Social
Security liabilities, since these liabilities arise outside the ten-year window
traditionally used in policy projections. Nevertheless, failure to recognize
this debt can create the false appearance among policymakers that there
is little fiscal benefit from moving a primarily PAYGO system to a funded
system that reduces long-term Social Security liabilities. A related problem
is that traditional tools for measuring the impact of reform, such as the
long-term actuarial balance, are ill-suited to capturing the full financial
benefit of moving to a funded system.
Perhaps the best place to see this is by taking a qualitative look at
the impact of particular reforms on Social Security finances. Figure 8-
1 indicates the impact of Model 2 on Social Security’s financial shortfall
over the next seventy-five years. These estimates assume two-thirds particip-
ation rates in the personal retirement accounts (results for alternative
participation results appear in Commission’s report). As Figure 8-1 shows,
under current law, Social Security is expected to run cash surpluses until
2016, after which point, annual deficits become a permanent and growing
problem. Annual deficits as a percentage of taxable wages are expected
to rise to nearly 2 percent by 2020, 4 percent by 2030, and over 6 per-
cent by 2075, the last year of Social Security’s actuarial horizon. Under
Model 2, the annual deficit begins a few years sooner, in 2010. It then
grows more slowly, reaches its maximum at 4 percent of payroll in 2030 and
shrinks thereafter. Surpluses are first achieved in 2059 and continue to rise
thereafter. Consequently, the reform proposal ultimately replaces current
law’s permanent and rising deficits with rising surpluses. By the end of the
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Figure 8-1. Impact of proposed reform (Model 2) on Social Security. (Source: CSSS
Final Report 2001.)
75-year actuarial horizon, the surpluses are expected to reach 1.4 percent
of payroll.
Perhaps the most interesting question for policymakers is how to quantify
the improvement in Social Security’s finances from the reform proposal.
One useful summary statistic is the reduction in the amount of additional
government revenues required to finance promised benefit payments. Yet
even this seemingly straightforward statistic is subject to measurement
problems, because the Social Security actuaries assume a fixed seventy-five-
year time horizon. This truncates the returns that accrue in the form of
lower traditional Social Security liabilities for persons who opt for personal
accounts. According to calculations performed for the Commission, the
present value of the reduced revenue requirements under Model 2 is
excluded because the fixed time horizon totals about $1 trillion.
Keeping in mind this measurement problem, Table 8-2 compares the
change in governmental revenue required under Model 2 with the tradi-
tional measure of Social Security’s financial shortfall under current law.
The traditional measure is the present value of the difference between
Social Security’s outgo and its income over the seventy-five-year actuarial
horizon, less the balance in the fund at the beginning of the time period.
This measure, when expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll over the
same time horizon, is called the actuarial balance. In 2001 the actuarial
balance was 21.86 percent, or if measured in present discounted value
terms, the trustees estimated the shortfall as $3.2 trillion.
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Table 8-2 Impact of Social Security Reform on Government’s Revenue
Requirement
Current Law
Revenue Required
($PV Trillions)
Reform Model 2
Change in
Revenue Required
($PV Trillions)
% Reduction
Traditional measure
Congress ‘saves’ all
surpluses
$3.2 −$2.0 63%
Alternative 2
Congress spent past
surpluses, but ‘saves’ future
surpluses
$4.1 −$2.0 49%
Alternative 3
Congress ‘spends’ all
surpluses
$5.1 −$2.3 45%
Source: Author’s computations, CSSS Final Report (2001).
When the Social Security actuaries examined Model 2, they calculated
both the reduction in Social Security surpluses during years in which Social
Security runs surpluses and the change in deficits during years in which
Social Security incurs deficits. The present value of this change is $2.0
trillion; in other words, Model 2 costs 63 percent less as compared to
the government’s revenue shortfalls under scheduled benefits and current
tax law. This set of estimates implicitly assumes that past Social Security
surpluses were ‘saved’—that is, they were used to reduce the national debt
and, hence, are available to finance future deficits. The inclusion of future
surpluses in the traditional measure implicitly assumes that future surpluses
will be similarly used and, hence, will be available to finance future deficits.
Nevertheless, as we have argued above, Congress has previously used Social
Security surpluses to finance consumption related to spending increases
and tax reductions, rather than for debt reduction. A similar pattern could
reasonably be expected for the future.
Table 8-2 also indicates that moving to a funded system inevitably
requires an investment, which may be viewed as the net additional general
revenue requirement associated with the proposed reform. For Model 2,
from 2005 to 2009, additional resources are needed to ensure that
promised benefits can be paid and personal accounts can be funded. In
dollar terms, transition financing requirements for Model 2 would initially
be comparatively small ($4 billion in 2010) and they would grow to a
maximum of just over $73 billion in 2016 (measured in 2001 dollars).
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Thereafter, the amount of new cash requirements for the reformed system
would diminish. Starting in 2029, the new system would require less general
revenue than the old one on a permanent basis. Thus, Model 2 requires
$0.9 trillion, or about half of 1 percent of GDP in present value terms,
between now and 2029. The Commission concluded that such an amount
would not pose major economic problems, though it could possibly raise
political concerns. Of course, putting the program on a long-term sustain-
able footing has some obvious rationale as well.
Conclusions
Commissioners concurred that the evidence is clear: Social Security reform
is both economically necessary and socially imperative, and the sooner
reforms are implemented, the better. If nothing is done to reform the
system, low earners will be particularly vulnerable to benefit cuts, and all
workers as well as retirees will confront substantial economic insecurity in
old age. The Commission’s proposed reforms would also put Social Security
on a self-financing basis for the first time in over a quarter of a century,
consistent with its founder Franklin Roosevelt’s vision. Our work shows that
personal retirement accounts can play an important role in a reformed,
financially sustainable, and more progressive Social Security system. We also
anticipate that many workers would elect personal accounts when they are
presented with a clear statement of the substantial political risks facing the
current Social Security system.
Notes
1 The reports, hearings and proceedings of the President’s Commission to Save
Social Security (2001), along with other background information, can be found at
<http://www.csss.gov>. The Commission was cochaired by Senators Daniel Patrick
Moynihan and Richard Parsons, who is chairman and chief executive officer of
AOL/Time Warner. Along with the two of us, the other twelve members were
Leanne Abdnor, former executive director of the Alliance for Worker Retirement
Security; Sam Beard, founder and president of Economic Security 2000; Bill Fren-
zel, former US Representative; Estelle James, consultant with the World Bank;
Robert Johnson, CEO of Black Entertainment Television; Gwendolyn King, former
Commissioner of Social Security; Gerry Parsky, former Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury; Tim Penny, former US Representative; Robert Pozen, at the time vice
chairman of Fidelity Investments; Mario Rodriguez, Hispanic Business Roundtable;
Thomas Saving, current Social Security Public Trustee; and Fidel Vargas, vice
president of Reliant Equity Investors. The staff members of the Commission also
included two economists, Jeffrey Brown and Kent Smetters.
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2 The generational accounting approach was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale,
and Kotlikoff (1991). See also the Symposium on Generational Accounting in the
Winter 1994 issue of this journal (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 1994; Haveman
1994).
3 An underappreciated point is that the Social Security program’s current benefit
formula could subject low-wage workers to greater economic risk than high-wage
workers. This outcome arises because for a low-wage worker, an additional dollar
of lifetime annual earnings adds 90 cents to Social Security benefits, while for a
high-wage worker, each additional dollar adds only 15 cents to benefits. For this
reason, fluctuations in lifetime pay and/or the national average wage could produce
larger variations at the lower end of the pay distribution. Empirical research to
evaluate the sensitivity of various earnings profiles to this type of variability would be
useful.
4 This review was conducted by a subgroup of commissioners known as the ‘Fiscal
Subgroup’, headed by Cochairman Richard Parsons. It included the Commission’s
four economists (the two authors of this chapter, along with Thomas Saving and
Estelle James) as well as Lea Abdnor, Gerald Parsky, Tim Penny, and Robert Pozen.
5 Specifically, in 2001, a single worker who retired at the normal retirement age
received benefits worth 90% of the first $561 of monthly average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME); 32% of each additional dollar of AIME up to $3,381; and 15% of
each additional dollar of AIME thereafter. These bend points, or the dollar amounts
that define the ranges over which percentage replacement rates are applied,
are indexed to the growth in average earnings of all workers covered by Social
Security.
6 These calculations include the fact that Social Security’s normal retirement age is
scheduled to rise to 67 years in 23 years. In the above examples, both typical workers
will pay an early retirement penalty of about 7% for retiring at age 65 years.
7 The 1979 Consultant Panel was chaired by economist William Hsiao, and mem-
bers included James Hickman, Ernest Moorhead, and economist Peter Diamond.
The minority views in the 1979 Advisory Council are those of Henry Aaron and
Gardner Ackley.
8 This outcome results from the fact that the offset is proportional to earnings,
while traditional benefits rise less than proportionately with earnings. The Com-
mission also considered an alternative approach in which the percentage of Social
Security benefits a worker would be required to forgo would depend on the per-
centage of payroll taxes the worker diverted to his personal account. Under such
an approach, a worker who diverted 20% of his payroll taxes to personal accounts
would forgo, say, 20% of his benefits. This approach was rejected because it would
create a greater incentive for high-wage workers to opt for personal accounts than it
would for low-wage workers, and it would not preserve as much of Social Security’s
progressivity as the Commission’s preferred approaches.
9 All the Commission’s reform plans recognize the historical relationship between
Disability Insurance benefits and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance finances bene-
fits. Today, the Primary Insurance Amount benefit formula is a common one, and
the programs’ finances are affected in similar ways by demographic changes. Hence,
Disability Insurance program outlays are projected to rise by 45% as a percentage
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of payroll over the next 15 years, and Disability Insurance costs will exceed Dis-
ability Insurance tax revenue starting in 2009. The Commission acknowledged that
a reformed Social Security system must take into account the fact that planned
retirement is a very different life event from an unplanned onset of disability.
Personal retirement accounts are partially intended to replace the finances benefit
component in Social Security. Disability Insurance beneficiaries with abbreviated
work histories might have relatively low-account balances. Some may argue that
this justifies isolating the Disability Insurance finances benefit structure from any
changes that would affect Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance finances benefits, but
testimony provided to the Commission indicated that many Disability Insurance
beneficiaries sought to maintain a parallel structure for both Disability Insurance
and Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance. We recommended further research to deter-
mine the optimal approach to balancing these adequacy and equity concerns in the
Disability Insurance system. For an introductory survey of disability programs in this
journal, see Burkhauser and Daly (2002).
10 Another controversial question had to do with the financial and economic costs
and benefits of providing guaranteed investments in the context of personal retire-
ment accounts. Even the inflation-indexed annuities would only be guaranteed to
rise with inflation—not guaranteed in their real return. The Commission elected
not to propose such guarantees, instead calling for more research on the likely
structure of such investment options. For relevant research on pension guarantees,
useful starting points include Bodie and Merton (1993), Bodie (2001), Feldstein
and Ranguelova (2000), Lachance and Mitchell (2002), and Smetters (2002a).
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